We describe how a diverse cast of characters including public health organizations, research laboratories, for-profit health care companies, activists and regulators, rolled back the outbreak of HIV/AIDS in just fifteen years. Moreover, as the case history shows, a stunning reduction in deaths from the diseases was accomplished largely through accretive advanceswithout developing a vaccine, an unambiguous test, or a complete cure.
From outbreak to roll back-in fifteen years-HIV/AIDS is a tale of our times. The disease was discovered in the early 1980s and became a pandemic by the mid-1990s. In a stunning turnaround, mortality has dropped by eighty-five percent in the United States since 1996. 1 Today, the life expectancy for Americans and Europeans infected with the virus can be the same as for those who are uninfected. This progress has been accomplished through accretive advances-without developing a vaccine, an unambiguous test, or a complete cure.
The rollback was propelled by an unusually diverse cast of characters in the United States and abroad, including:
Table 1 Selected Participants in the Development of HIV Tests and AIDS Treatments
The significance of the roll back extends beyond simply the control of the disease. Combatting HIV/AIDS also prompted important changes in the practices of major organizations like the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
In the next three sections of this case we will see how these players helped: control the transmission of the disease; develop several generations of tests to identify and measure Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV") in the blood (and other bodily fluids); and treat infected patients, allowing them to lead normal lives. The concluding section summarizes recent developments. The focus of this case is primarily on the United States and Europe; our story excludes important developments in Asia and Africa.
Controlling Transmission (1981-1990)
Identifying the disease. The HIV virus is now thought to have jumped from apes to humans in the 1910s in Central Africa and then spread along ferry and rail routes to become an epidemic in the Congo in the 1950s. In the 1960s and 1970s, it arrived in the West through Western artifacts and behavior-syringes, blood banks, blood products, drug use, anonymous sex, and international travel.
The grave threat infections posed was not recognized for another ten years. The reason: HIV infections gradually induce AIDS ("Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome") by slowly killing "helper T-cells," which help the body's immune system adapt to and resist diseases. It takes about a decade to deplete the Immunologists, epidemiologists, and other medical researchers quickly undertook studies that would eventually rule out several possible causes (and "cofactors" acting in concert), including fungal toxins, consumption of popular club drugs ("poppers" b ), stress, and pregnancy. 3 While the research proceeded, reports collected in five states suggested the possibility of infection through a blood-borne virus. c CDC officials therefore sought to protect the blood supply by restricting who could donate to blood banks. At a meeting in July 1982, assistant director Jeffrey Koplan tried to persuade representatives of government organizations, blood banks, pharmaceutical manufacturers, the Hemophilia Foundation, and gay groups to back the exclusion of gay men and Haitians from blood donation. However, many participants were concerned about depleting blood supplies and did not want to turn donors away as long as the cause of AIDS remained uncertain. 4 Blood supply controls were instituted in March 1983 after researchers had identified the HIV virus. (More on this in the next section.) Public health officials mandated the exclusion of several groups from blood donation: anyone with signs or symptoms of AIDS, gay and bisexual men with multiple partners, intravenous drug users, and-most controversially-recent Haitian immigrants. d Heat treatment of blood and blood products became routine after researchers found high temperatures killed the virus in late 1984. And blood banks screened newly donated blood and existing blood supplies once the first tests became available in 1985 (as discussed in the next section).
The CDC also sought to protect doctors, nurses, and dentists who might come in contact with infected blood or bodily fluids by recommending the use of gloves, gowns, aprons, masks, eyewear, disposable needles and scalpels, and disinfectants on potentially contaminated surfaces. 5 Other initiatives to control transmission focused on risky behavior. Several attracted controversy. Public health officials collaborated with the owners of gay bathhouses and sex clubs to distribute AIDS educational pamphlets and condoms to patrons (who often used the venues for engaging in sex). These initiatives were opposed by groups promoting abstinence. San Francisco, New York, and Los Angeles city a Gottlieb had contacted the New England Journal of Medicine about publication, but the editor there suggested the MMWR, because articles in medical journals go through a lengthy refereeing process before publication, and the editor believed it was important to get the word out quickly.
b "Poppers" refers to amyl nitrites. c Cases included hemophiliacs and an infant who had contracted the disease after a transfusion from a known donor who also developed AIDS. officials' orders to shut down bathhouses faced legal challenges from bathhouse owners. e Volunteers started needle-exchange programs for drug addicts in Washington, California, New York, Oregon, and Connecticut. These programs broke state laws against possession and distribution of injection drug paraphernalia. A few public health departments then worked to decriminalize and expand the needle exchanges.
Diagnostic screening of individuals (in addition to screening of blood) for HIV improved efforts to control risky behavior. U.S. military recruits, immigrants, and some insurance applicants were required to submit to tests. f Health authorities also promoted voluntary testing. The Public Health Service (PHS) mailed a brochure to every household in the United States in 1988 that encouraged individuals in groups considered high risk to seek tests. In 1993, the CDC advised all hospitals, outpatient clinics, and emergency departments to offer HIV testing and counseling to anyone hospitalized or seeking care, and in 1995 recommended that all pregnant women have an HIV test. 6 HIV-positive individuals were encouraged or pressured to use condoms, reducing infection among their partners. The prospect of regular testing may have also discouraged risky behavior. 7 Non-profits focused on AIDS complemented the work of public health organizations by offering free testing and counseling. (See Exhibit 1)
These multifaceted actions helped sharply reduce infection rates before any effective treatments (described in Section 3) were developed. 8 Controlling Transmission in Europe. Public health officials in Europe recognized the threat presented by AIDS in the same year as the United States. By the end of 1981, physicians in Britain, France, Denmark, and Spain had documented AIDS cases in gay men. The next year, physicians in France and Germany began to see AIDS cases in hemophiliacs, and, like CDC officials, suspected the disease was caused by a blood-borne virus. At the beginning of 1983, European public health officials met to discuss restrictions on donors to blood banks, but, as with the U.S. in 1982, decided against. The majority of San Francisco bathhouses closed immediately or soon after the initial order. A few bathhouses chose to monitor patrons. One bathhouse refused all directives and fought charges brought by the city until it closed in 1987.
f Five states banned HIV antibody testing by insurers beginning in 1987, but some of these restrictions were temporary.
Once researchers confirmed the viral cause of AIDS, public health officials in Switzerland, France, and Germany initiated programs to identify donors who engaged in risky behavior but still stopped short of excluding groups from blood donation. Most European countries required the heat treatment of blood and blood products beginning in 1985. And, like their American counterparts, European blood banks began to screen blood for HIV once the first tests became available.
After 1985, European health authorities promoted voluntary testing in high risk groups-sex workers, gay and bisexual men, intravenous drug users, migrants, prisoners, and pregnant women-rather than in the general population. 9 Although the number of AIDS non-profits was smaller in Europe than in the United States, European AIDS organizations also offered testing and counseling, and encouraged the use of condoms. 10 
Developing Tests (1981-1999)
Virological Foundations. Developing tests for HIV, which, as we have seen, helped to control transmission, posed several challenges. HIV is a "retrovirus," rather than a regular virus. And, when AIDS was first recognized, knowledge of human retroviruses was scarce. Previously retroviruses had been mainly found in animals, and only two human retroviruses had been very recently identified. HIV also had several variants, all of which could not be detected by a single test. In addition, tests had to be adapted to mutations within strains. 12 Teams at the American National Cancer Institute (NCI) and the French Pasteur Institute took the first steps. NCI virologist Robert Gallo had recently identified the first two human retroviruses (which caused cancers) in 1980 and 1981. He decided to investigate AIDS at the urging of the CDC's task force on AIDS. The Pasteur Institute developed vaccines for infectious diseases, and Pasteur virologist Luc Montagnier had studied animal retroviruses. He focused his lab on AIDS after receiving two separate requests from French physicians who wanted tissue samples from French AIDS patients examined for evidence of a retrovirus. 13 Montagnier's team at Pasteur isolated and analyzed the retrovirus first, photographing it with an electron microscope. The team published its findings in May 1983. And, even before publication the French researchers shared the virus they had isolated with Gallo's group at the NCI. Each lab was aware of the other's interest and progress, and Gallo and Montagnier had close professional ties. 14 Gallo's lab at the NCI was second to identify the retrovirus, but in their May 1984 publications they offered stronger evidence that the retrovirus was the cause rather than a correlate of AIDS. Using several test methods, Gallo and his colleagues had shown that the retrovirus was present in some members of a high-risk group and absent in all members of a low-risk group. Follow up studies by other researchers using Gallo's test reinforced the causal connection. 15 Other labs soon replicated Montagnier's and Gallo's results. Jay Levy, a researcher at the University of California, San Francisco, published his evidence of a retroviral cause for AIDS in Science in August 1984. That fall, research teams in England and Italy provided similar evidence. Thus a consensus formed on the viral cause of AIDS. The Pasteur and NCI teams then developed prototype tests for infections that relied on the detection of HIV antibodies. Our immune systems produce distinctive antibodies to fight infections by particular viruses (or retroviruses). The presence of an HIV antibody in a blood sample could be inferred from its interaction with a "conjugate" extracted from viral particles cultured in a lab. (Later, as we will see, the conjugates could be synthesized using genetic techniques.) g NCI researchers filed for a U.S. patent for their test in April 1984 and received approval from the U.S. Patent Office in May 1985. The Pasteur Institute had filed for a patent five months before the NCI but had not received any response from U.S. patent authorities by then. In December, the Pasteur Institute sued the US government. It charged that the NCI (part of the U.S. government) had based its patent in part on Pasteur's sample, in violation of an agreement to use the materials for non-commercial research, and demanded royalties from the sale of tests licensed by the NCI. The U.S. government and the Pasteur Institute eventually reached an out-of-court agreement to share licensing fees, which Presidents Ronald Reagan and Jacques Chirac announced at the White House on March 31, 1987. 16 Scientific credit for the discovery was also controversial. A commission appointed by the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses confirmed that the virus found by the NCI team was identical to the ones discovered earlier at Pasteur. 17 The committee's report did not settle the issue of credit, however, which resurfaced after Montagnier shared the 2008 Nobel Prize for Medicine, but Gallo was excluded. 18 First Screening Test Kits. In the spring of 1984, just two weeks after it filed for patents, the NCI solicited proposals from companies interested in developing commercial test kits using the NCI's intellectual property and viral samples. Test developers required the samples in order produce the conjugates needed to detect HIV antibodies. However, because the NCI's ability to grow sufficient quantities of viral samples was limited, it established criteria by which it would select the companies that would receive samples. h The criteria included specific technical skills, adequate containment facilities, and the capacity to ramp up sales and marketing nationwide.
Reflecting the urgency of test development, the NCI asked that the required application be returned in ten days. Twenty companies met the deadline, of which eight satisfied the criteria. The NCI chose five. 19 (See Table 2) g The Pasteur team, which had first isolated the retrovirus, was also first to propose a test for detecting two of the antibodies to it.
NCI researchers (who were second) proposed tests for different antibodies and a wider range of techniques for detecting infection with a viral extract.
h HIV was very difficult to grow compared to other viruses. By October 1985, all five companies had developed kits and received the FDA's approval to market them. Abbott Laboratories was the first to receive approval, in March 1985.
The Pasteur Institute supplied its viral samples to just two developers. One was an in-house commercial arm of Pasteur that produced vaccines and tests, which would focus on the European market. The other was Genetic Systems Corporation, a recent (1981) biotech startup located in Washington State, which was expected to focus on the U.S. market. Genetic Systems obtained approval from FDA for the kit developed with Pasteur's viral samples in February 1986.
Advances in Screening Tests.
The test kits sold in 1985 and 1986 (now referred to as "first generation" tests) had some limitations. They detected the antibodies to HIV-1 infection, which was common in the United States and Europe, but not to HIV-2 infection, which was less widespread but not absent. 20 The kits could not detect infections for up to twelve weeks after occurrence. And, they were calibrated to minimize undetected infection (to achieve a low rate of false negatives), but this calibration produced a high number of false positives. i 21 "Second generation" test kits, first introduced in 1987, mitigated problems in first generation screening tests by adding synthetically-produced materials to conjugates that had previously been composed entirely of extracts from a cultured virus. The synthetic materials, produced with the help of recent advances in genetic technologies, did not have the contaminants that extracts from cultured viruses contained and the greater purity reduced false positives. These new kits also enabled detection of HIV-2 infection and reduced the period between occurrence and detection of infection from up to twelve weeks to no more than six. 22 "Third generation" test kits, first introduced in 1991, relied entirely on synthetic conjugates, eliminating impurities introduced by contaminants in cultured viral extracts altogether and producing more accurate results (fewer false positives and false negatives). These new kits could also detect a variant of the retrovirus that the second generation tests could not, and further reduced the period between occurrence and detection of infection from six weeks to three. 23 Confirmatory Protocols were instituted to control the problem of false positive screening tests. Protocols in all three generations entailed administering screening tests repeatedly to control for measurement errors. First generation protocols also used "Western blot" and "immunofluorescence assays" (IFA) to confirm positive results and for individuals who repeatedly tested negative. j Confirmatory protocols for second i The implications of false positives were a major problem when diagnosing individuals, but less so in screening blood and blood products. and third generation screening tests that could detect HIV-1 and HIV-2 infections, but not distinguish between the two, used a more elaborate procedure. 24 (See Table 3 ) Fourth generation screening tests developed in the late 1990s reduced the period between occurrence and detection of infection to less than two weeks by enabling the direct detection of a key viral protein, in addition to detection of antibodies produced by the immune system in response to infections. 26 Rapid screening tests introduced around the same time as the third generation tests (and harnessing the same advances in genetic technologies) traded off cost for speed. Cambridge Biotech k introduced a twohour screening test that used a conjugate made entirely with synthetic materials in May 1990. It was marketed by a division of Johnson & Johnson, an American pharmaceutical, medical device, and consumer health product company, to hospitals, blood banks, and commercial labs who were willing to pay a significant premium for rapid turnaround. l k After its 1990 merger with Biotech Research Laboratories, Cambridge Bioscience became Cambridge Biotech.
l Cambridge Biotech's rapid screening test cost approximately ten times more than the average HIV screening test in that day. Faster and more expensive confirmatory tests (Western blots) were introduced around the same time period, as well. The first, from Bio-Rad Laboratories, reduced the time needed for confirmation from 24 to three hours.
At-home tests were technically feasible, but regulators resisted them because of concerns about accuracy and inadequate counseling for those who tested positive. As early as 1986, University Hospital Laboratories (UHL), a small startup, sought FDA approval for a kit for collecting blood samples at home, which would then be sent to UHL's lab for testing. Instead of acting on UHL's application, however, the FDA announced rules in 1988 that made the sale of any at-home tests nearly impossible. UHL sued the FDA in 1990. The FDA reversed its policy against home collection of samples and reviewed UHL's application, but then asked UHL to submit a revised application with more data and revisions to labeling. In 1993, Johnson & Johnson acquired UHL and resubmitted an application for home collection kits. The FDA approved the Johnson & Johnson application in 1996; the FDA's press release announcing the approval referred to a 1995 CDC survey that had found that twice as many patients at risk for HIV infection would seek testing if given an at-home option.
Saliva-and urine-based tests, which were more convenient and cheaper to administer than blood-based testing, were also resisted by American regulators. In 1991, the FDA ruled that saliva-and urine-based kits required full review and approval before distribution and mandated a recall of existing kits. When one company, Clinical Reference Laboratory, refused to comply, the FDA sent federal marshals to seize its kits. By the mid-1990s, the FDA had bowed to pressure from insurance companies and loosened (but did not eliminate) restrictions. The agency approved the first saliva collection kit in December 1994 and the first urine sample collection kit in August 1996, but it continued to restrict the use of both kits to hospitals, clinics, and doctors' offices. 27
Markets and Competitors. As of 1992, Abbott, which had been first to secure FDA approval in 1985, had maintained its lead in screening tests in the U.S. market. Although Abbott's tests had periodically fallen behind as testing technologies (discussed earlier) had advanced, high switching costs had discouraged its customers from purchasing competing kits. 28 Tests sold by Pasteur's commercial arm (which by that time had acquired its American licensee Genetic Systems Corporation) 29 Monitoring Tests. Early tests typically monitored the progression of the disease in patients already diagnosed with AIDS in one of two ways: one method measured proteins produced by the virus whose composition changed as the disease progressed; the other method estimated the number of helper T-cells in patients, because helper T-cells died off as HIV infections worsened. Both were considered somewhat indirect markers of the progress of the infection.
Monitoring tests became more accurate and convenient once companies harnessed advances in genetics in the late 1980s. Using only a very small sample of blood, genetic monitoring tests measured the amount of the HIV retrovirus in patients' bodies, or the so-called "viral load." 32 Demand for monitoring tests grew in the 1990s as the number of AIDS treatments multiplied (as described in Section 3). Physicians needed monitoring tests to assess patients' responses to treatments, and researchers developing new drugs required monitoring tests to assess drug efficacy.
Many monitoring tests were licensed unbranded to laboratories. Regulatory rules allowed laboratories to use their own tests, instead of buying ready-to-use test kits, provided they only used the tests in-house. Some companies introduced their monitoring technologies by granting lab licenses first, and then sought regulatory approvals for kits. For example, in the early 1990s, Roche licensed their viral load test to labs, and then went on to obtain FDA approval in 1996. 33 Tests that counted helper T-cells accounted for eighty percent of overall sales of monitoring tests in 1992. (See Figure 6 ) Although, as mentioned, monitoring tests were relatively crude, because of the high cost, the total sales revenues of the monitoring tests exceeded those of screening and confirmatory tests in that year. Concentration increased as the market for monitoring tests increased in the 1990s. By the end of that decade, Roche emerged as the leader in the large U.S. viral load monitoring test market. q Unlike the screening and confirmatory test markets, concentration in the monitoring test markets reflected a lack of entrants. 34 (See Figure 7) q German pharmaceutical maker Bayer acquired Chiron's diagnostics division in 1998, inheriting its share-the second-largest-in the U.S. viral load testing market. By 2012, Roche would be ranked first among HIV test makers in Europe, and Abbott would be second.
Figure 7 Market Shares of Monitoring Test Markets, United States, 1999
Source: Frost and Sullivan (2000).
Testing in Europe.
As in the United States, regulators played an important role in Europe, but the rules differed by country. r Regulators in Europe began to approve the first generation screening test kits in 1985 (the same year as the FDA first approved kits in the U.S.). Second and third generation test kits were introduced in Europe at the same time as in the United States, in 1987 and 1991, respectively. Some European regulators were less resistant to at-home testing than the FDA. The United Kingdom permitted home collection kits, which allowed users to take their own blood samples and ship them to a lab for HIV testing. However, test kits for home use (that would not require processing in a lab) remained restricted.
Similarly, European regulators proved more open to the use of saliva-and urine-based tests (allowing samples to be collected at home and processed in the lab). 35 Notwithstanding the differences in rules, European screening test markets exhibited similarities in concentration and market leadership. 
Developing Treatments (1984-2010)
The First Effective Treatment: AZT. Initially, researchers at the NIH had tried-and failed-to treat AIDS by boosting or restarting patients' immune systems with drugs, transfusions, and bone marrow transplants. After the retroviral cause of AIDS had been established, NCI and other researchers began testing drugs that had a proven effect on animal retroviruses. s
In 1984, researchers at the American subsidiary of Burroughs Wellcome, a British pharmaceutical company, identified the first promising compound: AZT (azidothymidine). AZT had been synthesized in 1964 (with funding from the NCI) in an unsuccessful effort to treat leukemia. In the 1970s German researchers found it halted the reproduction of animal retroviruses, suggesting to Burroughs Wellcome researchers that AZT could potentially treat AIDS. They retested it on animal retroviruses with excellent results and forwarded the drug to NCI researchers for testing on cultured HIV samples.
After NCI researchers found AZT effective against cultured HIV, Burroughs Wellcome sought and received support from the FDA to test and distribute the drug quickly. The agency permitted significant deviations from its normal, three-phase drug approval process, which could take a decade to complete. 36 (See box "Phases of Clinical Trials") In the case of AZT, it approved the drug in just two years, and after two instead of the traditional three phases. And, even before formal approval, the agency allowed Burroughs Wellcome to make AZT available immediately to a large number of patients. t
In spring 1987, immediately after receiving FDA approval (and a year before securing a patent), Burroughs Wellcome began selling AZT. It priced the drug at almost $10,000 per patient per year; according to Sir Alfred Sheppard, the former chairman of Burroughs Wellcome's British parent company, Wellcome set the price without knowing "the demand, how to produce [the drug] in high quantities, or what competing drugs might come on the market." 37 s These efforts were focused on treatment, rather than a cure, but even that goal was elusive. 
Phases of Clinical Trials
Typically drug developers who have found a compound that has potential for treating a diseases test it against a "model" of the disease in test tubes ("in vitro") and in animals such as rats and mice ("in vivo"). After further testsfor instance, to assess potential toxicity and safety in humans, among other things-and determining a potentially suitable dosage and form (tablet, capsule, liquid, etc.), an investigational new drug (IND) application is filed with the FDA, which includes everything that is known about the compound.
If the FDA does not object in thirty days, the IND is approved and human clinical trials begin.
Phase 1 of the trials tests whether the drug is safe and can be tolerated by humans, and Phase 2 tests whether the drug actually works and in what dosage. Both Phase 1 and Phase 2 are small-scale trials, usually with less than a couple of hundred patients.
Drugs that pass Phase 1 and Phase 2 trials then enter much larger-scale and more comprehensive Phase 3 trials. These can involve several thousand patients and are intended to generate data about the drug's effectiveness for specific indications, to test for a broad number of potential side-effects, and to identify the best ways to administer and use the drug.
The process involves considerable risk. According to a report of the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, only five out of 5,000 compounds that go into preclinical testing make it to a Phase 1 human trial, and only about one of those five is ultimately approved by the FDA.
The price provoked immediate outrage. AIDS activists protested on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange, inside Burroughs Wellcome's North American headquarters in North Carolina, and in major cities across the U.S. and in the UK. Activists also organized boycotts of Wellcome's other products, such as the cold remedy Sudafed. The drug's price also provoked scrutiny from the U.S. Congress. As part of a spring 1987 investigation into federal funding of drugs, a House Committee questioned Burroughs Wellcome executives at length about their pricing process.
Burroughs Wellcome responded by lowering AZT's price by twenty percent in December of 1987 and again by twenty percent in September of 1989. The company also offered free AZT to low income patients and children, and collaborated with the oldest AIDS group in the UK, the Terrence Higgins Trust, on HIV/AIDS education and prevention.
Pressure for More Treatment Options. AZT had significant limitations. It did not cure the disease and had serious side effects. The drug extended the lives of patients by one to two years but after that patients developed resistance to the drug. It also induced nausea and vomiting, damaged muscle tissues, and caused anemia. Given AZT's drawbacks, activists pressured regulators and drug companies to speed development of new treatments and to make drugs widely available before they had received final approval. Writer Larry Kramer helped found the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP) in 1987, which led a large, wellpublicized demonstration in October 1988 that forced the FDA to temporarily close their offices. ACT-UP's dramatic protests and slogans made it one of the most prominent AIDS activist groups, but it was hardly alone. San Francisco activists held a sit-in at San Francisco General Hospital and blocked the Golden Gate Bridge during rush hour in 1989. In these actions and others, activists' demanded a variety of changes to the way clinical trials were run. (See box "Activists' Demands") In addition to activists' protests, some patients circumvented FDA rules to seek out experimental treatments not available in the United States. Those that could afford to travelled to Europe, Mexico, or Japan for therapies. Others formed "buyer's clubs" to import and distribute unapproved drugs.
Activists' pressure prompted several changes. The NIH consolidated and expanded its network of clinical trial sites, which made it easier for more AIDS patients to join trials and get access to experimental treatments. The FDA approved larger-than-usual trials and allowed use of experimental treatments outside of clinical trials via its "compassionate use" and "parallel track" programs. These last two initiatives made treatments available shortly after they were approved for use in humans and did not limit what other drugs
Activist's Demands
ACT-UP and other AIDS groups demanded changes in the ways drugs were tested, such as:

Offering immediate free access to experimental drugs to any HIV-infected person as soon as the drugs were determined safe for human consumption (after Phase I safety trials and before Phase II efficacy trials).  Allowing studies that tested the performance of an experimental drug against another experimental drug or a different dosage of the same drug, rather than limiting controls to testing an experimental drug against a placebo or an existing standard of care, as FDA rules then required.  Imposing fewer restrictions on the number and types of other drugs a trial participant takes (outside of the treatment being studied).  Including more women, people of color, children, intravenous drug users, and hemophiliacs of all class levels and ages, in different stages of infection, in studies, either in the main clinical trial or in a parallel clinical trial.  Requiring that Medicaid and private health insurance companies pay for experimental treatments.  Including indirect or "proxy" indicators of patient health, such as helper T-cell levels or viral load, in evaluating the results of trials.
a patient could take. u The FDA also offered "accelerated approvals" based on proxy indicators such as improved T-cell counts, and allowed importation of unapproved drugs for personal use.
No immediate breakthroughs followed, however. The NCI synthesized two new AIDS drugs, and researchers at Yale University, a third. All three were similar to AZT, and, like AZT, they had significant side effects. 38 Therefore, two of the drugs, Videx and Zerit were approved for use only after patients developed resistance to AZT. v In the case of the third-Hivid w -the FDA recommended it be taken in combination with AZT to mitigate its toxicity. 39 Although AZT remained the most prescribed AIDS treatment, by 1992, over a dozen companies (including four startups) had new AIDS drugs in development. (See Table 5 ) Six of these drugs developed received rapid FDA approval under the agency's accelerated approvals program. (See Table 6 ) These approvals would be instrumental in the next breakthrough in treatment, which was combination therapies (discussed below). u "Compassionate use" use granted treatments to patients who were extremely ill, but didn't qualify for clinical trials; "parallel track" allowed companies to study the everyday use of treatments by patients not enrolled in traditional clinical trials, and collect and submit data on those patients when they sought FDA approval.
v Videx and Zerit were approved in in 1991 and 1994, respectively.
w Hivid was approved in 1992. Combination Therapies. In the early 1990s, researchers began investigating therapies consisting of combinations of compounds; such combinations had previously been shown to be more effective than single compounds in treating cancer and tuberculosis. In 1993, the NIH made combination regimens a "top priority" in its labs and clinics, and by 1995, over twenty major combination trials had been launched in North America and Europe. 40 Research on two combinations presented at the 1996 International AIDS Conference in Vancouver in 1996 showed they worked markedly better than single drugs. 41 Conference attendees then endorsed a new standard of care based on multi-drug combinations, called "HAART," for "Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy." Since the FDA had already approved the drugs included in HAART, physicians switched tens of thousands of AIDS patients to combination therapies within weeks of the Vancouver conference. 42 In just a few years, combinations (HAART) had a stunning effect in reducing death rates in the United States and in Europe. 43 Although HAART showed high efficacy, many patients struggled to follow its complex, multi-pill regimens. To increase patient compliance, Glaxo Wellcome (formed through a merger between Glaxo and Wellcome in 1995) created a single pill, "Combivir," containing standard doses of two of its AIDS drugs.
FDA approved Combivir in October 1997, marking the first time the agency had approved combinations of drugs in a single pill on the basis of improved patient compliance. Hitherto, FDA rules had required companies to show that combination pills had therapeutic advantages that made them more effective than their components taken as separate pills. Combivir obtained European regulators' approval the next year, and other companies soon followed Glaxo Wellcome's lead. 
Epilogue (after 2010)
Testing. New genetic tests that can now identify nearly one hundred separate HIV mutations have enabled personalized treatment plans. Physicians can now track mutations associated with drug resistance in each patient and adjust combination regimens as necessary. 46 Siemens has entered the testing market, developing fourth generation tests, as well as automated and semi-automated testing systems, after its acquisition of Bayer Healthcare's diagnostics division in 2007. Today, Siemens ranks fifth among world HIV diagnostics companies, after Abbott, Alere y , BD Biosciences (part of Becton Dickinson), and Roche. 47 Treatments. Physicians now choose from a wider selection of drugs designed to disrupt HIV at many points when prescribing combinations. 48 (See Table 7 ) Gilead Sciences, a biotech company started in 1987, has become the market leader in AIDS treatments. z (See Figure 13 ) Gilead acquired the intellectual property to an AIDS treatment from the Czech chemist Antonin Holy after it was founded. The drug, sold as "Viread," was eventually proven to be much less toxic than similar drugs, including AZT. Viread was approved in the US and Europe in 2001, and three years later, Gilead obtained approvals for a single pill that combined Viread with another of its AIDS drugs, which it named "Truvada." After the success of Truvada, Gilead developed a variety of additional singlepill combinations, both alone and in partnership with former competitors.
Truvada enjoyed even greater success after studies showed it could also protect against HIV infections. In couples with one HIV-infected partner and one uninfected partner, the uninfected partner could prevent infection by taking Truvada. 49 The greatest challenges in HIV/AIDS today are to reproduce successes on a global scale. By one estimate, anti-HIV drugs have produced over $600 billion in economic value between 1996 and 2010 in the United States. 50 However, HIV remains a major public health threat globally and the vast majority of patients are in low-and middle-income countries. Thirty-seven million people were living with HIV/AIDS in 2014, including over two-and-a-half million children. Approximately two million new HIV infections were recorded that year. Seventy percent of HIV/AIDS patients live in sub-Saharan Africa, which is also where seventy percent of new HIV infections are recorded. Ninety percent of all people on combination regimens live in low-to middle-income countries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa. 51 Today's global priorities include: better education and prevention programs; increased access to testing and counseling; and simpler, cheaper, and more widely available combination regimens.
In the United States, the lasting impact of HIV/AIDS continues to be felt. The NIH remains central to medical research, but maintains and expands upon the new relationships with patients and private, state, and local organizations that HIV/AIDS brought about. And rapid drug approvals have become the norm at the FDA, rather than the exception. These and other changes continue to provoke debate-and speak to the unusual role that the epidemic has played. z GlaxoWellcome's patent on AZT expired in 2005, and competitors introduced four generic versions immediately afterwards. In 2009, GlaxoWellcome and Pfizer created a new company, Viiv Healthcare, to research, develop, and produce branded HIV therapies, including drugs for pre-exposure prophylaxis. Viiv also licenses drugs for generic production in low-and middle-income countries. As of 2012, Viiv's global share was ten percent (See Figure 13) , but it has since grown. Heavily involved in research and development of the first three treatments for AIDS.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Set case definition for AIDS. Helped write guidelines for and coordinate distribution of treatments.
The Public Health Service (PHS)
Helped write guidelines for and coordinate distribution of treatments.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
Reviewed and approved treatments. Established standards of safety and efficacy. Regulated distribution and use of treatments.
Corporations (including startups and large multinationals)
Researched, developed, manufactured, marketed, sold, and distributed treatments. Ran clinical trials independently and in collaboration with the NCI and NIAID.
Activists
A diverse array that included over 600 organizations and advocacy groups, as well as ACT-UP (The AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power) and the Terrence Higgins Trust (in the UK).
